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C amp a i g n F i n a n c e
Tax Code Section 527 Groups Not an End-Run Around McCain-Feingold
BY EDWARD B. FOLEY AND DONALD TOBIN
I n the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recentdecision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commis-sion, 72 U.S.L.W. 4015 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2003), uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act, known as the McCain-Feingold law, large-
dollar donors seeking to influence federal elections are
looking for ways other than through soft-money contri-
butions to political parties.
Particular attention has focused on so-called 527 or-
ganizations, named after the section of the Internal
Revenue Code that grants tax-exempt status to political
organizations whose primary purpose is to influence
elections.
Widely publicized, for example, is the announcement
of George Soros, the wealthy financier who supports a
variety of liberal causes, that he intends to donate $10
million to a newly created 527 organization called
America Coming Together, or ACT, whose self-declared
purpose is ‘‘to defeat George W. Bush and elect pro-
gressive candidates all across America.’’1
Similarly, big-money conservative donors have cre-
ated a corresponding 527 organization called Ameri-
cans for a Better Country (ABC) with the explicit pur-
pose of facilitating ‘‘President Bush’s reelection, the de-
feat of the eventual Democratic Presidential nominee,
and the election of Republican candidates to the United
States Senate and House.’’2
But there is a huge potential hitch in the idea that 527
organizations can serve as repositories of large-dollar
donations for the purpose of influencing federal elec-
tions. If these 527 organizations also count as ‘‘political
committees’’ under the Federal Election Campaign Act
1 Interestingly, ACT has created a ‘‘nonfederal’’ account
that provides disclosure with the Internal Revenue Service as a
Section 527 organization, and a federal account that is regis-
tered as a political action committee with the FEC. Its Web site
indicates that amounts donated exceeding $5,000 will be
placed in the organization’s ‘‘nonfederal’’ account.
2 FEC Advisory Opinion Request 2003-37.
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(FECA), then contributions to them are capped at
$5,000 per donor.
There is a huge potential hitch in the idea that
527 organizations can serve as repositories of
large-dollar donations for the purpose of
influencing federal elections.
In other words, Soros and others like him would not
be permitted to give seven-figure contributions to a 527
organization in order to elect or defeat a federal candi-
date, including President Bush.
This article, therefore, will analyze both the statutory
and constitutional questions concerning whether 527
organizations are ‘‘political committees’’ under FECA
and thus subject to the $5,000 cap on the contributions
they receive from each donor. The article will also con-
sider whether other forms of tax-exempt organizations
besides 527s—most notably so-called 501(c)(4)
organizations—provide an alternative means of circum-
venting this $5,000 contribution limit.
In the end, however, any organization whose ‘‘major
purpose’’ is to influence federal elections will be subject
to this limit, which the Supreme Court is likely to up-
hold.
Definition of ‘Political Committee’ Under FECA. The ex-
press terms of FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A), encompass
within its definition of ‘‘political committee’’ any group
that receives ‘‘contributions’’ or makes ‘‘expenditures’’
exceeding $1,000 per year.
Because FECA in turn defines ‘‘contribution’’ or ‘‘ex-
penditure’’ to apply whenever any gift or payment is
made ‘‘for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office,’’ a literal reading of FECA would mean
that any group that spends more than $1,000 in a year
to influence a federal election would be a ‘‘political
committee’’ under the act.
To obviate the far-reaching implications of this literal
reading, however, the Supreme Court has stated that a
group will not fall within FECA’s definition of ‘‘political
committee’’ unless its ‘‘major purpose’’ is to influence
federal elections.3 As we shall explain, any organization
with such a major purpose will be classified as a ‘‘politi-
cal committee’’ under FECA, and all 527 organizations
that focus on federal rather than state elections will do
so.
Debate Over ‘Major Purpose’ Test. In recent years,
there has been considerable debate and uncertainty
concerning how this ‘‘major purpose’’ test operates in
practice. A key question has been whether, in calculat-
ing the portion of a group’s spending devoted to the
purpose of influencing federal elections, the only
spending that counts is money used for ‘‘express advo-
cacy,’’ meaning messages containing ‘‘Vote for Smith,’’
‘‘Defeat Jones’’ or the equivalent.
In 2001, the FEC began a rulemaking proceeding to
consider this and other questions but suspended the ef-
fort, in large part to await the enactment and judicial re-
view of the McCain-Feingold revisions to FECA.4 Now
that the McCain-Feingold legislation has been upheld
by the Supreme Court, it is time to revisit the definition
of ‘‘political committee’’—as indeed the FEC is likely to
do when ruling upon a request for an advisory opinion
submitted by ABC, the conservative 527 organization
mentioned at the outset.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court developed
the ‘‘major purpose’’ limitation on the definition of a
‘‘political committee’’ as an alternative to its ‘‘express
advocacy’’ test. The court discussed both in the context
of construing FECA’s disclosure requirement applicable
to groups that are not political committees but that
make some expenditures to influence federal elections.
The court said that, with respect to these (non-PAC)
groups, it was necessary to construe disclosure require-
ments as limited to express advocacy, so that the statu-
tory term ‘‘for the purpose of influencing a federal elec-
tion’’ was not too vague or broad. But with respect to
‘‘political committees,’’ the same statutory term could
be protected from such problems by the alternative
means of the ‘‘major purpose’’ test. As long as the cat-
egory of ‘‘political committees’’ is limited to those
groups whose ‘‘major purpose’’ is to influence federal
elections, the court explained, then the expenditures of
such groups ‘‘can be assumed to fall within the core
area sought to be addressed by Congress.’’ They are,
the court added, ‘‘by definition, campaign related.’’
Thus, because of the ‘‘major purpose’’ test, a political
committee’s spending is subject to regulation under
FECA whether or not this spending is for ‘‘express ad-
vocacy.’’ Given this fact, it would make little sense to
say that the only spending that determines whether a
group is a political committee is spending for express
advocacy. Instead, any spending that shows the ‘‘major
purpose’’ of the group to be influencing federal elec-
tions would so qualify. This conclusion stems from con-
sidering Buckley alone.
‘McConnell’ Confirms ‘Buckley’ Approach. McConnell
clearly confirms this point and puts the matter to rest.
There the court squarely held that the ‘‘express advo-
cacy’’ test was not a constitutional requirement, but
only an exercise of statutory construction.
Using different statutory language, including specifi-
cally McCain-Feingold’s new definition of ‘‘electioneer-
ing communications,’’ Congress has the authority to
reach different categories of activities designed to influ-
ence federal elections. Moreover, in McConnell,5 the
Supreme Court specifically invoked the category of
‘‘political committee,’’ as narrowed by the ‘‘major pur-
pose’’ test, as an example of a constitutionally permis-
sible scope of regulation.
Thus, at a minimum, the portion of a group’s spend-
ing devoted to the new category of ‘‘electioneering com-
munications’’ would count in determining whether the
group’s ‘‘major purpose’’ is to influence federal elec-
tions.
3 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
4 66 Fed. Reg. 13,682 (March 7, 2001).
5 Slip opinion at 62.
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At a minimum, the portion of a group’s spending
devoted to the new category of ‘‘electioneering
communications’’ would count in determining
whether the group’s ‘‘major purpose’’ is to
influence federal elections.
Even so, it would make more sense to consider the
portion of a group’s spending on what the McCain-
Feingold law specifically defines as ‘‘federal election ac-
tivities.’’ These include public communications that
‘‘promote, support, oppose, or attack’’ a federal candi-
date, as well as voter registration and get-out-the-vote
activities designed to benefit federal candidates.
As the court in McConnell explicitly recognized,
large-dollar donors give to support these activities pre-
cisely because they affect the outcome of federal elec-
tions: ‘‘federal candidates reap substantial rewards
from any efforts that increase the number of like-
minded registered voters who actually go to the polls.’’6
Accordingly, if a majority of a group’s spending falls
within the statutorily defined category of ‘‘federal elec-
tion activities,’’ then the group should be considered a
‘‘political committee’’ under FECA.
Of course, there should be no need for the FEC to
conduct an audit of a group’s spending if the group pub-
licly declares that its major, or exclusive, purpose is to
influence federal elections. Such a declaration, by itself,
should trigger the obligation to register with the FEC as
a ‘‘political committee’’ and comply with the relevant
rules, including the $5,000 cap on contributions to the
group.
In the case of ACT and ABC, the two 527 organiza-
tions that have prompted so much inquiry, it would ap-
pear that they have both made such public declarations.
Indeed, as we shall discuss, eligibility for tax-exempt
status under Section 527 would seem to require such a
declaration.
527s and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations. To qualify as
a 527 organization under the federal tax code, an entity
must have influencing elections as its primary purpose.
The tax code reads specifically that 527 status applies
when an organization is ‘‘organized and operated pri-
marily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accept-
ing contributions or making expenditures, or both, for
an exempt function.’’7
In turn, the tax code defines ‘‘exempt function’’ as
‘‘the function of influencing or attempting to influence
the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of
any individual to any Federal, State, or local public of-
fice.’’8
Putting aside for the moment the important qualifica-
tion that the primary purpose of a 527 organization may
be to influence state (or local)—rather than federal—
elections, this primary purpose test under the tax code
is essentially the same as the ‘‘major purpose’’ test un-
der FECA. In other words, if an organization qualifies
as a 527 group because its ‘‘primary purpose’’ is to in-
fluence federal elections, then it follows that the organi-
zation is a ‘‘political committee’’ under FECA, with its
‘‘major purpose’’ being to influence federal elections.
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has equated the ad-
jectives ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘major’’ when discussing the
‘‘major purpose’’ test under FECA—in Massachusetts
Citizens for Life Inc. v. FEC (MCFL), the court observed
that the organization there would be a ‘‘political com-
mittee’’ if the ratio of its electoral to non-electoral
spending shows that ‘‘its primary objective is to influ-
ence political campaigns.’’9
Despite this congruence of the adjectives ‘‘major’’
and ‘‘primary,’’ it might have been argued beforeMcCo-
nnell, based on the ‘‘express advocacy’’ concept, that
the scope of the ‘‘major purpose’’ test under FECA was
much narrower than the scope of the ‘‘primary pur-
pose’’ test under 527 of the tax code. In other words, if
‘‘express advocacy’’ were the only kind of activity that
counted in determining whether influencing elections is
an organization’s ‘‘major purpose’’ under FECA, then
(according to this argument) an organization that never
engages in ‘‘express advocacy’’ could still have its ‘‘pri-
mary purpose’’ under 527 be influencing elections, be-
cause the term ‘‘influencing’’ under 527 applies to a
broader class of activities than just ‘‘express advocacy.’’
In fact, the Internal Revenue Service has specifically
ruled that such activities as partisan get-out-the-vote
(GOTV) and voter registration drives count as having
the purpose of influencing an election in order to deter-
mine an organization’s primary purpose under 527.10
Gap Disappeared With ‘McConnell’ Decision. After Mc-
Connell, however, any gap that arguably might have ex-
isted between the meaning of influencing elections un-
der FECA and 527 has disappeared.
As we have seen, the best reading of FECA after Mc-
Connell is that an organization that devotes a majority
of its spending to ‘‘federal election activities,’’ as de-
fined by McCain-Feingold and discussed in McConnell,
has influencing federal elections as its major purpose
and thus is a political committee under FECA.
Yet the kind of activities that count as ‘‘federal elec-
tion activities’’ under this definition—voter registration,
GOTV, and communications supporting or opposing a
candidate even though they lack ‘‘express advocacy’’—
are just the sort of activities that qualify as seeking to
influence an election under 527. Thus, any organization
that devotes itself primarily to this category of activities
is both a 527 organization under the tax code and a po-
litical committee under FECA.
There remains to consider, however, state-oriented
527 organizations—ones devoted primarily to influenc-
ing state (or local), rather than federal, elections. If an
organization were to devote itself exclusively to influ-
6 Slip op. at 59.
7 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1).
8 I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
9 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986).
10 See IRS Private Letter Ruling 1999-25051 (March 29,
1999) (partisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives qualify
as attempting to influence an election under Section 527); but
see Treas. Regs. § 1.527-6(b)(5) (nonpartisan registration and
get-out-the-vote drives are not expenditures for an exempt
function). The IRS, however, has a very liberal definition of
what is partisan, see P.L.R. 1999-25051 (finding activities are
partisan if they are designed ‘‘to increase the election pros-
pects of pro-issue candidates as a group’’).
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encing state races and never spend a penny of its funds
on ‘‘federal election activities,’’ then quite clearly it
would still qualify as a 527 group and yet not be a ‘‘po-
litical committee’’ under FECA. The same point is true
of organizations that devote most of their spending to
influencing state elections and only a minor portion of
their resources to ‘‘federal election activities.’’
Thus, a 527 organization—like the Soros-supported
ACT—could escape being a ‘‘political committee’’ under
FECA if the major part of its efforts were devoted to
state-specific activities rather than ‘‘federal election ac-
tivities.’’ Determining whether a 527 organization is
successful in this regard requires assessing the ratio of
its spending on ‘‘federal election activities’’ in compari-
son to its spending on state-specific electoral
activities—if the former is greater than the latter, then
the 527 is a political committee under FECA, but other-
wise not.
Since the big advantage of evading the ‘‘political
committee’’ designation is the ability of a 527 organiza-
tion to receive contributions in amounts greater than
$5,000 per donor, there is an enormous incentive to
keep this ratio lower than 50-50. But for those 527 orga-
nizations that do so, they are entitled to this prize. After
all, the inevitable consequence of the ‘‘major purpose’’
test is that those organizations whose spending on ‘‘fed-
eral election activities’’ remains only a minor part of
their mission need not comply with the extra strictures
that FECA imposes on political committees. 11
It becomes especially important, however, that the
FEC keep an eagle eye on these organizations, to see if
they cross the 50-50 threshold, so that those 527 organi-
zations that should be classified as political committees
are properly regulated.12
Comparison to 501(c)(4) Groups. There is another
kind of tax-exempt organization that needs discussion:
the so-called (c)(4) organizations, named after I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4). In contrast to 527 organizations, (c)(4) or-
ganizations are not permitted to have influencing elec-
tions as their primary purpose, although they may en-
gage in electioneering as a secondary activity.13 This
kind of organization, then, would seem a useful vehicle
for escaping the designation of a ‘‘political committee’’
under FECA. By contrast, 501(c)(3) organizations—
which have additional tax benefits beyond those avail-
able to (c)(4) groups pursuant to I.R.C. Section
501(c)(3)—are not permitted to participate either di-
rectly or indirectly in political campaigns and thus can-
not serve as a vehicle for electioneering.14
But the same sort of ratio analysis as described above
would apply to organizations seeking to maintain (c)(4)
status. If an organization spends more of its funds on
‘‘federal election activities’’ than it does on the non-
electoral ‘‘social welfare’’ functions that make it eligible
for tax exemption under (c)(4), then the organization
would not qualify for (c)(4) treatment—and also would
be a political committee under FECA.
Conversely, however, if an organization spends less
on ‘‘federal election activities’’ than on these other ‘‘so-
cial welfare’’ functions, then it would be entitled to
(c)(4) status and would not be subject to ‘‘political com-
mittee’’ designation under FECA.
Again, therefore, policing this spending ratio is cru-
cial to determining whether the organization may re-
ceive donations in excess of $5,000.
Two Options for Spending. Thus, there are two ways
for tax-exempt organizations to spend a substantial
portion of their funds on ‘‘federal election activities,’’ to
influence federal elections, without suffering the stric-
tures of being a political committee under FECA. One is
to spend more on state-specific electoral activities,
while the other is to spend more on non-electoral activi-
ties that qualify as ‘‘social welfare’’ functions under
(c)(4).
Because this second category of activities may prove
more attractive to some donors than the first—some do-
nors may be uninterested in state elections but inter-
ested in sponsoring the kind of generic ‘‘public policy’’
discourse that counts as a ‘‘social welfare’’ function un-
der (c)(4)—one would expect to see some political orga-
nizations exercising the (c)(4) option, rather than be-
coming a ‘‘state 527 organization,’’ even though there
are extra tax advantages associated with being a 527 or-
ganization rather than a (c)(4) organization.1511 In focusing on the ratio of spending devoted to state and
federal electoral activities, we do not mean to preclude the pos-
sibility that it might be necessary to examine also some other
measure of an organization’s relative commitment to federal
and state activities, such as the ratio of time spent on these two
categories. This caveat applies throughout our analysis of the
‘‘major purpose’’ test.
12 This analysis does not address the separate question
whether ‘‘state 527 organizations’’ that are not ‘‘political com-
mittees’’ under FECA nonetheless are prevented from receiv-
ing contributions from corporations or unions under separate
provisions of FECA that specifically constrain electioneering
by corporations and unions. Likewise, this analysis assumes
that, to avoid designation as a ‘‘political committee,’’ a ‘‘state
527 organization’’ must itself remain unincorporated.
13 See Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in
1990) (providing that organization qualifies as Section
501(c)(4) organization if ‘‘it is primarily engaged in promoting
in some way the common good and general welfare of the
people of the community’’); Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c)(4)-
1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (providing that ‘‘the promo-
tion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect partici-
pation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office’’); see also Rev-
enue Ruling 81-95, 1981-1 Cumulative Bulletin 332 (providing
that Section 501(c)(4) organization may participate in political
campaign as long as its primary function is promotion of so-
cial welfare).
14 Section 501(c)(3) organizations may, however, engage in
voter education activities and attempt to influence legislation
as long as it is not a substantial part of their activities. See also
Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (noting that
organization is action organization and does not qualify for
Section 501(c)(3) status if a ‘‘substantial part of its activities is
attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or other-
wise’’); DANIEL SIMMONS, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation
and Campaign Finance Reform, 54 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 1, 107-
108 (2002) (arguing that Section 501(c)(3) and (c)(4) organiza-
tions may be used as a conduit for campaign activities because
the definition of political intervention is very vague and the
IRS is slow to revoke an organization’s tax exempt status).
15 Most notable is the fact that contributions to 527 organi-
zations are exempt from the federal gift tax that the donor oth-
erwise would be required to pay, whereas contributions to
(c)(4) groups do not receive a similar exemption from the gift
tax. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5). For a thorough discussion of the
gift tax issue see TOBIN, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 611 (2003),
at 648-651, 653-655.
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To be sure, some organizations may engage in both
of these ‘‘nonfederal’’ categories of spending, and if
their combination of spending on ‘‘federal election ac-
tivities’’ and state-specific electoral activities exceeds
their non-electoral spending, they may qualify as a 527
organization without being a political committee under
FECA, even though their state-specific electoral spend-
ing is a small fraction of the total.
An example helps to illustrate this point. Suppose an
organization spends 45 percent of its funds on ‘‘federal
election activities,’’ only 10 percent on state-specific
electoral activities, and 40 percent on non-electoral
‘‘public policy’’ discourse. Because it spends a majority
of its funds to influence both federal and state elections
collectively, it qualifies as a 527 organization. Yet be-
cause it spends less on ‘‘federal election activities’’ than
it does on its other political activities (i.e., its state-
specific and non-electoral ‘‘public policy’’ activities), it
arguably does not have influencing federal elections as
its ‘‘major purpose’’ under FECA.
To avoid this result, one might say that the ‘‘major
purpose’’ of an organization is influencing federal elec-
tions whenever it spends more on ‘‘federal election ac-
tivities’’ than on either state-specific electoral activities
or non-electoral ‘‘public policy’’ activities. This ap-
proach is not foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s discus-
sion of the ‘‘major purpose’’ test in Buckley and MCFL.
But, in the absence of legislative clarification from Con-
gress, it would seem that the better understanding of
the ‘‘major purpose’’ gloss that the court imposed on
FECA would be that a majority of an organization’s
spending for political purposes must come within the
category of ‘‘federal election activities’’ rather than on
the combined ‘‘nonfederal’’ category of both state-
specific electoral activities and non-electoral ‘‘public
policy’’ discourse.
Constitutional Question. In considering whether it is
constitutional to impose a $5,000 ceiling on contribu-
tions to an organization that devotes a majority of its
spending to ‘‘federal election activities,’’ we begin by
observing that George Soros, or any other wealthy indi-
vidual, has a First Amendment right to spend unlimited
amounts of money on ‘‘federal election activities,’’ and
this point is true regardless of the particular type of
‘‘federal election activity’’: voter registration, GOTV, or
communications supporting or opposing a candidate
(whether ‘‘express advocacy,’’ ‘‘electioneering commu-
nications,’’ or otherwise).16
If Soros has this right as an individual, then—the ar-
gument goes—several individuals should be equally en-
titled to get together to pool their resources to exercise
the same First Amendment right.
It is a powerful argument. Indeed, it persuaded Jus-
tice Blackmun, who adopted it in his separate concur-
rence in California Medical Association v. FEC, 453
U.S. 180 (1981), parting company with the plurality
opinion, which expressly left the issue undecided. The
court in California Medical confronted only the situa-
tion in which a ‘‘political committee’’ itself makes dona-
tions directly to the campaigns of federal candidates,
thereby falling within the special category of a ‘‘multi-
candidate political committee’’ under FECA, and thus
the California Medical court did not need to resolve the
key question of whether the same $5,000 limit on con-
tributions to a political committee is constitutional if
and when the committee confines itself to activities that
are uncoordinated with any candidate’s own campaign.
Under the Supreme Court’s consistent campaign-
finance jurisprudence—including McConnell—
contributions to third-party organizations receive
significantly less First Amendment protection than
an individual’s own spending.
Despite the force of the argument that persuaded Jus-
tice Blackmun to offer dicta on this issue in his Califor-
nia Medical concurrence, the fact remains that a contri-
bution to a political committee is a contribution, and not
an individual’s own spending.
Under the court’s consistent campaign-finance
jurisprudence—including McConnell—contributions to
third-party organizations receive significantly less First
Amendment protection than an individual’s own spend-
ing. ‘‘Because the communicative value of large contri-
butions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate the
speech of their recipients,’’ the court in McConnell con-
firmed that ‘‘contribution limits impose serious burdens
on free speech only if they are so low as to ‘preven[t]
candidates and political committees from amassing the
resources necessary for effective advocacy.’ ’’17 The
fact that contribution limits cause recipient organiza-
tions to raise money from more rather than fewer do-
nors, in the court’s view, is not a negative.
McCain-Feingold Limits Upheld. Moreover, in McCon-
nell, the court specifically upheld the new limits that
McCain-Feingold imposes on contributions received by
state political parties for ‘‘federal election activities.’’ By
confining state parties to so-called ‘‘hard money’’ under
FECA whenever they engage in ‘‘federal election activi-
ties’’ (subject to the qualification that state parties may
also use so-called Levin funds for these activities under
certain circumstances and restrictions), McCain-
Feingold imposed a $10,000 contribution limit to state
parties for these federal election activities. The court
held that this contribution limit was justified by the po-
tentially corrupting effect on federal candidates result-
ing from large-dollar donations to state parties.
As the court explained, this contribution limit ‘‘is pre-
mised on Congress’ judgment that if a large donation is
capable of putting a federal candidate in the debt of the
contributor, it poses a threat of corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption.’’18 The court further observed
that contributions to state parties for ‘‘federal election
activities’’ are precisely the category of contributions
16 The right to spend unlimited funds on voter registration
or GOTV activities presumably would be limited to advocacy in
this regard and would not extend to any form of quid pro quo
payments to promote registration or voting. In other words,
Congress could prohibit financial inducements to individuals
paid in exchange for registering to vote, or going to the polls,
but could not limit expenditures advocating that individuals
register or that they go to the polls.
17 Slip op. at 25 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
18 Slip op. at 58.
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‘‘that can be used to benefit federal candidates di-
rectly.’’19
Political committees, of course, are not the same
thing as political parties. The court in McConnell itself
observed this fact, noting that political parties are
unique in their connection to candidates, in large part
because only parties ‘‘select slates of candidates for
elections’’ and only parties ‘‘determine who will serve
on legislative committees, elect congressional leader-
ship, [and] organize legislative caucuses.’’20
Nonetheless, political committees are also distinct
from other forms of political interest groups, because
political committees have as their ‘‘major purpose’’ the
election or defeat of federal candidates. Consequently,
large-dollar donations to political committees present
risks of corrupting federal candidates similar to large-
dollar donations to state parties for their ‘‘federal cam-
paign activities,’’ and greater risks of corruption than
donations to interests groups that are not devoted pri-
marily to winning elections.
Political Indebtedness. Both donors and candidates
see political committees—precisely because their pri-
mary purpose is to win elections—as vehicles for spend-
ing that benefits candidates. Therefore, candidates will
be especially indebted to political committees, and do-
nors seeking special leverage over candidates once in
office (the kind of ‘‘undue influence’’ that the Supreme
Court in recent cases, including McConnell, has recog-
nized that Congress is entitled to combat) will be espe-
cially attracted to political committees as a way to se-
cure this special leverage.
Accordingly, for the same reason that Congress has
the power to cap contributions to state parties for ‘‘fed-
eral election activities,’’ Congress should have the same
power to cap contributions to political committees,
which have these same ‘‘federal election activities’’ as
their predominant focus, because their major purpose is
to influence federal elections.
Moreover, with respect to the need to accommodate
the competing interests of free speech and electoral in-
tegrity, the dividing line between political committees
and other interest groups is a sensible one. As long as
an interest group refrains from making winning elec-
tions its ‘‘major purpose,’’ then individuals (including
George Soros) can donate funds to the group in unlim-
ited amounts in order to exercise jointly their First
Amendment rights.
But once an interest group crosses the line, and de-
votes the major portion of its activities to winning fed-
eral elections, then the compelling congressional inter-
est in protecting the integrity of federal elections—and
the integrity of the legislative process that depends
upon these elections—takes over and permits limits on
the amount of money an donor can give to the interest
group.
A close reading of the footnotes in McConnell, while
not resolving the issue, supports this analysis. In foot-
note 51 of its opinion, the court expresses its agreement
with Chief Justice Rehnquist ‘‘that Congress could not
regulate financial contributions to political talk show
hosts or newspaper editors on the sole basis that their
activities conferred a benefit on [a federal] candidate.’’
(Emphasis in original.)
Neither talk shows nor newspapers are political com-
mittees whose major purpose is to win federal elections.
Instead, to the extent they engage in ‘‘federal election
activities,’’ they do so as incidental to their primary
media-related purposes. Consequently, money given to
them does not raise the distinctive risks of corruption
associated with large-dollar donations to political com-
mittees, which (like political parties) are inherently
electoral in nature given their primary purpose.
Constitutional Cap on Contributions. By contrast, foot-
note 48 of the court’s opinion indicates that it is consti-
tutional to cap the contributions received by political
committees, even if those contributions are used for
spending independent of a candidate’s campaign,
rather than for coordinated spending or direct contribu-
tions to a candidate.
After citing the $5,000 limit on contributions to ‘‘mul-
ticandidate political committees’’ upheld in California
Medical, as well as the $25,000 limit on aggregate con-
tributions to parties, PACs, and candidates upheld in
Buckley, footnote 48 states that ‘‘[these] limits re-
stricted not only the source and amount of funds avail-
able to parties and political committees to make candi-
date contributions, but also the source and amount of
funds available to engage in express advocacy and nu-
merous other noncoordinated expenditures.’’ In the
same footnote, the court continues: ‘‘If indeed the First
Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating con-
tributions to fund the latter, the otherwise easy-to-
remedy exploitation of parties as pass-throughs (e.g., a
strict limit on donations that could be used to fund can-
didate contributions) would have provided insufficient
justification for such overbroad legislation.’’
What the court is saying here is that money received
by political committees may be subject to limits not only
when that money is used to make direct contributions
to candidates, but also when used for independent ac-
tivities. While this language cannot be taken as a dis-
positive ruling on the question expressly left open in
California Medical, it is a strong hint at how that ques-
tion should be answered.
Perhaps, however, the ultimate lesson to take away
from McConnell on this constitutional question is that
the answer might depend on the strength of the evi-
dence before the court concerning the risks of corrup-
tion at the time the question is under review.
McConnell upheld the contribution limits on state
parties because the evidence there overwhelmingly
showed that the risk of corruption was real, not merely
theoretical.
If, whenever the court considered the constitutional-
ity of the $5,000 cap on contributions to political com-
mittees that confine themselves to spending indepen-
dent from candidates, the evidence regarding the risks
of corruption is thin, then there is a much greater
chance that the court would invalidate the limit. Con-
versely, were the government to develop a record com-
parable to the one in McConnell, it is likely that the
limit would be upheld.
Conclusion. Forming a 527 or (c)(4) tax-exempt orga-
nization as a vehicle for receiving large-dollar dona-
tions to spend on influencing federal elections is not an
easy end-run around McCain-Feingold.
Many 527 organizations that attempt to influence fed-
eral elections are also political committees and thus
19 Id. at 59.
20 Id. at 81.
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subject to the $5,000 contribution cap that comes with
the ‘‘political committee’’ designation under FECA.
To be sure, if the tax-exempt organization spends
less on ‘‘federal election activities’’ than on both state-
specific election activities and non-electoral functions,
then the organization can escape the political commit-
tee designation and the contribution cap.
But wealthy donors seeking to influence federal elec-
tions may be somewhat deterred by the fact that more
than 50 percent of their contributions must be devoted
to activities other than for what they wish to give their
money.
Accordingly, we can expect a 527 organization that
wishes to spend most of its money on ‘‘federal election
activities’’ to challenge the constitutionality of this cap
as applied to any organization that meets the definition
of ‘‘political committee’’ under FECA, even if all the or-
ganization’s ‘‘federal election activities’’ are uncoordi-
nated with a candidate’s own campaign.
Although the outcome of this constitutional challenge
ultimately depends on the strength of the evidence that
the government can develop regarding the potential
risk of corruption resulting from large-dollar donations
to ‘‘political committees,’’ as distinct from other politi-
cally motivated interest groups, the reasoning of McCo-
nnell points to the conclusion that ‘‘political commit-
tees,’’ like ‘‘political parties,’’ may be subject to contri-
bution limits that would not be permissible if imposed
on other organizations.
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